

Is There any Logical Entity Tying Web and Philosophy Together?

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Being able to explain what philosophy brings to web practices or what the Internet offers interrogative thinking depends on the performative value of using scientific language. But first of all, why would one wish to know more about the relationship between web and Philosophical practices ? Perhaps for enhancing one's activity whether it be on the web or in philosophy, or even for establishing statistics on combined uses of the two domains. Whatever the reason, successfully using scientific language requires interlocutors to each refer to objects and concepts from their own point of view. This is where the notion of reference —as elaborated upon by J. Duran in *Metaphilosophy* (July 1996)— becomes key to fleshing out a general theory about the relationship between the discipline of Philosophy and the advent of fibre optics, IP addresses, e-mail, social networks, blogs, google and random paperlessness in our society.

Indeed, the failure of contemporary philosophy to effectively assign valuable meaning to doing philosophy *about* on-line issues is the problem of philosophy today. And in noticing our increasing dependancy upon the internet —for this latter has become for many a "surrogate thought-bearer"—, it becomes increasingly difficult to understand just what the importance of philosophical activities could be to the web community, if any. This is especially stressed by some of the titles and explanations we see in the press : "Is Google Making us Stoopid?"¹. I suspect that some philosophers still think that issues brought up by the existence of electronic communities and services are not worthy of philosophical considerations ; this would probably be because of Internet's relative recent history (it is not an *academic* discipline yet). All in all, there seems to be a communication-based problems between many actors of the two domains.

My hypothesis is that the two fields do not quite see eye-to-eye. In the present talk, I argue that being able to explore —with inspiration from anglo-saxon literature— the nature of what lies

¹CARR N., (2008), in *The Atlantic*, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/07/is-google-making-us-stupid/6868/> or http://news.cnet.com/8301-13505_3-9962935-16.html

between web and philosophy could only help in understanding more about the relationship between web-strong technologists and technicians of all things philosophical.

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